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ABSTRACT Political representatives frequently make decisions with far-reaching implica-
tions for citizens and societies. Most of these decisions are choices in situations in which the
probabilities of gains and losses are hard to estimate. Although decision-making is crucial to
politics, existing research has hardly ever addressed the political representation of traits that
notably inﬂuence decision-making. One such trait is risk propensity; that is, an individual’s
willingness to take risk. Using a unique dataset consisting of representative samples of the
German Federal Parliament, four German State Parliaments, and the general German
population, the present study investigates the degree to which political representatives’ risk
propensity resembles their constituents’ appetite for risk. Not only descriptive results but
even after using matching techniques and controlling for several potentially confounding
variables, the study shows that political representatives are signiﬁcantly more risk loving than
the average citizen across several domains of risk taking. The implications of this ﬁnding are
twofold. First, it points at a representation gap suggesting that politicians tend towards riskier
choices than their voters, which not only affects politicians themselves but the entire polity.
Second, it suggests a useful ‘division of labor’ according to which risk-loving politicians are
prepared to take risks in exceptional situations, which their constituents would eschew.
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Political representatives frequently have to make decisionsunder risk in environments where the probabilities of gainsand losses are hard to estimate. Historically, many political
leaders are known for high risk propensities. They have shown a
considerable appetite for risk, for example George Washington
crossing the Delaware, Frederik Willem de Klerk ending apart-
heid in South Africa, and Shinzo Abe restarting Japan’s nuclear
power plants after the Fukushima meltdown. And when Julius
Caesar crossed the Rubicon river, he explicitly mentioned the
riskiness of this decision: “Let the die be cast”. Caesar highlights
the risk, not knowing what the outcome would be.1 On the other
hand, anecdotal evidence points at political leaders shunning
away from risky decisions, for instance U.S. President Barack
Obama’s politics of compromise and appeasement was criticized
as too hesitant. And former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was
infamous for “sitting problems out”. However, when at the end of
the eighties a window opened for German uniﬁcation, Chancellor
Kohl made risky decisions. Importantly, appetite for risk tends to
be normatively framed, in politics, as well as in other ﬁelds. For
example, former U.S. President Richard M. Nixon once said: “If
you take no risks, you will suffer no defeats. But if you take no
risks, you win no victories.”2 And Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of
Facebook, is quoted with: “The biggest risk is not taking any risk.
In a world that is changing really quickly, the only strategy that is
guaranteed to fail is not taking risks.”3
Given that in representative democracies small political elites
make decisions that have consequences for most members of
society, it is an interesting question whether political repre-
sentatives do – and in fact should – resemble their constituents
regarding their risk propensity. Representing constituents is cri-
tical for the functioning of democratic political systems, but
voters might be much less or substantially more risk seeking than
their political representatives. Are political representatives, due to
their personal traits, signiﬁcantly more risk loving than their
electorate? Or are their voters willing to take substantially greater
risks? And do differences in risk propensity pose a challenge to
the principle of democratic representation?
In political theory, representation refers to “the making present
in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present
literally or in fact” (Pitkin, 1967, p 8f). This understanding of
representation emphasizes that political actors (parties or politi-
cians) make present actors other than themselves (Wolff, 2013).
The critical distinction between different concepts of repre-
sentation is in their speciﬁcation of the phrase “in some sense.”
Procedural conceptions look at the proportionality of votes and
seats. Substantial representation emphasizes correspondence or
congruence of political attitudes between representatives and
constituents, e.g., regarding political issues or ideologies. A third
concept highlights the correspondence of traits like age, ethnicity,
and gender for political (descriptive) representation, although not
all traits are equally relevant to be represented (Pitkin, 1967;
Mansbridge, 2003; Phillips, 1995). “We would not want to
complain that the large class of stupid and maleﬁcent people have
too few representatives in parliament” (Grifﬁths and Wollheim,
1960, p 190). Rather, democracies should aim at being descrip-
tively representative regarding a selection of relevant traits
(Mansbridge, 1999).
On the one hand, this “representativeness beyond political
attitudes” is supposed to safeguard against, for instance, political
elites promoting the interests of speciﬁc groups or, more gen-
erally, making biased decisions. On the other hand, political
representatives clearly must assume a role of political leadership.
Effective leadership, as is well-established in the business, orga-
nization, and political science literature (Derue et al., 2011), goes
hand in hand with speciﬁc personality traits and competencies
that seem to be rather exceptional than widespread in a popu-
lation, regardless of whether they are based on innate (e.g.,
genetic traits) or acquired (e.g., education) factors (Hartley, 2014).
Moreover, citizens might appreciate politicians having traits and
competencies that they themselves lack and that enable political
representatives to make proper decisions and implement good
policies in complex and uncertain environments. One of these
traits shown to be critical for decision-making, in particular
under risk and uncertainty, is risk propensity (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Sitkins and Weingart, 1995; Yechiam and Ert,
2011; Zuckerman and Kuhlman, 2000).
Regarding political leadership, risk propensity is mainly stu-
died in international politics and presidential decision-making
(Mintz and DeRouen, 2010; Kowert and Hermann, 1997; Keller
and Foster, 2012). However, given the prevalence of democratic
systems around the world, we know surprisingly little about
political representatives’ risk propensities and how they compare
to the risk attitudes of the individuals they represent. Results of
existing studies that look at the speciﬁc traits and competencies of
political representatives are inconclusive at best (Headey, 1974;
Hermann, 2014). Although the link between politicians’ indivi-
dual risk attitudes and the practices of collective political decision
making in which they are usually involved is far from clear, there
are two perspectives offering initial insights.
First, the impact of individual risk preferences on actual
decision-making is qualiﬁed by contexts in which decisions are
made collectively and subjected to debate and joint deliberation,
as in most legislative procedures. Although the evidence is
inconclusive, studies indicate that collective decisions can be even
more risk seeking than the risk attitudes of individual group
members would suggest (e.g., Sutter, 2009) and that group deci-
sions approximate rationally optimal decisions more so than
individual decisions (Kugler et al., 2012).
Second, when engaging in political decision making on a
speciﬁc risk object (e.g., peace, climate, public health), it remains
unclear what politicians’ individual objects at risk (e.g., re-election
chances, status, popularity; see Boholm and Corvellec, (2010), for
this distinction) and hence the points of reference of individual
risk preferences are.
To our knowledge, there are only two studies that have
investigated politicians’ individual risk propensities in view of
political decision making. Martin, (2016) ﬁnds that politicians’
risk aversion is positively associated with voting for the status quo
instead of for a new policy and that this association is mediated
by ideology. This study does not really address our research
question. Sheffer and colleagues (2017) do so and they demon-
strate that politicians show higher levels of risk seeking behavior
than non-politicians in a hypothetical choice experiment. How-
ever, their study does not use representative samples.
Because the exact links between politicians’ risk attitudes and
political decision making remain opaque, we take a ﬁrst step to
better understand this link and its underlying mechanisms based
on representative samples of members of parliaments. Therefore,
we investigate the degree to which political representatives’ risk
propensity resembles citizens’ risk propensity. To this end, we
carried out surveys of members of the German Federal Parlia-
ment (Deutscher Bundestag) (N= 175) and members of selected
German State Parliaments (Landtage) (N= 123), and use data on
the German population available in the German Socio-Economic
Panel Study (SOEP).
Risk, political leadership, and occupational selection. Various
lines of research establish that risk propensity, i.e. an individual’s
preference towards risky options, is a signiﬁcant predictor of
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decision making in different domains (Sitkins and Weingart,
1995; Yechiam and Ert, 2011; Zuckerman and Kuhlman, 2000).
Risk attitudes need to be distinguished from risk perceptions that
refer to the likelihood that an event or situation is construed as
involving risk in the ﬁrst place (Weber and Milliman, 1997). For
example, individuals with a high risk propensity (“risk lovers”)
are more likely to choose risky alternatives that are associated
with potentially high gains but also with higher losses than
individuals who are risk-averse (Nosic and Weber, 2010). While
the perception of risk is thought to be highly culture speciﬁc
(Weber and Hsee, 1998), risk attitudes are conceived of as dis-
positions or personality traits that develop during early sociali-
zation (Dohmen et al., 2012; Josef et al., 2016; van den Bos and
Hertwig, 2017), notably interacting with speciﬁc genetic predis-
positions for risk seeking or aversion (Roe et al., 2009).
Regarding the question of who becomes a politician or political
leader, the literature has not yet established robust patterns of
either demographics or speciﬁc personality traits (Hermann,
2014). Most recent studies on occupational selection of
politicians, however, indicate that although politicians are smarter
and have more pronounced leadership skills than the average
population, selection on other variables, such as social back-
ground, rather follows meritocratic than elitist principles (Dal Bó
et al., 2017). Also, personality traits such as dishonesty seem to
play a role for self-selecting into politics (Fehrler et al., 2016),
although the role of risk attitudes has rarely been studied in this
respect.
Given that risk attitudes develop during infancy and
adolescence (Dohmen et al., 2011) it seems unlikely that active
engagement in politics signiﬁcantly alters one’s risk attitudes in a
speciﬁc manner. A more obvious mechanism of why politicians’
risk attitudes might differ from those of the general population is
occupational selection. Theories of occupational selection hold
that risk attitudes systematically inﬂuence career choice (Sapienza
et al., 2009; Bonin et al., 2007). Risk-averse individuals are likely
to choose less risky occupations and vice versa. For example,
employees in the public sector who often are tenured civil
servants have, on average, comparably low risk propensities, while
entrepreneurs and the self-employed are known for having high
risk propensities (Brown et al., 2011; Caliendo et al., 2010).
Politics is an occupation that involves risks in various respects.
First, and regarding political decision-making, countless decision
problems are characterized not only by risk, but by fundamental
uncertainty, such as those regarding foreign affairs, economic
policies, welfare reforms, or environmental protection (Weinberg,
1972; Boettcher, 2004; Levy, 2003, Mercer, 2005; Kam, 2012).
Second, political representatives are frequently (at least every
electoral term) at risk of failing in their job, i.e. of not being re-
elected. Becoming a professional politician is also risky because
politicians have to win elections to party boards and committees
while the probability of making it into the political elite is
comparably low. Third, becoming a professional politician is
costly and bound to personal investments with uncertain
outcomes. In most democratic systems, including Germany, to
be nominated by one’s party for a position in a national or state
parliament involves constant competition with political rivals,
within and across party lines. Politicians have to climb the ladder
within their parties to earn merit and prestige for their
nomination. These considerable costs and uncertain outcomes
should thus attract individuals with a high appetite for risk.
Fourth, a major motivation to seek a job as an elected politician is
the prospect of wielding political power, as Max Weber famously
put it (1919, p 2): “He who is active in politics strives for power”
(see also Winter, 2002). Research shows that individuals in
powerful positions are able to make riskier choices than those
who are not (Da Silva, 2014; Anderson and Galinsky, 2006),
mainly because power is associated with access to resources that
can be used to mitigate the negative consequences of a risky
choice. Fifth, political leadership has been shown to involve severe
health risks given the high probability that elected representatives
experience poor health and develop burn-out (Weinberg and
Cooper, 2003), which might also speak in favor of the
occupational selection hypothesis.
In sum, as an occupational arena, politics is characterized by
factors that should attract individuals with a high risk propensity,
simultaneously repelling the risk-averse. Therefore, we hypothe-
size that political representatives have a signiﬁcantly higher risk
propensity compared to the population average and, conse-
quently, are likely to deviate from citizens and voters in the
choices that they make when facing a menu of decisions.
Materials and Methods
To compare political representatives’ with constituents’ risk atti-
tudes, we use data from two sources. First, we looked at a
nationally representative panel of the German population that
contains well-established measures of risk attitudes. Second, in
contrast to many studies of elite attitudes and personalities that
have relied on expert evaluation (cf. Caprara et al., 2003, p 849), we
conducted surveys amongst members of the German Federal
Parliament and four German State Parliaments with identical risk
attitude measures and standard socio-demographics. Using the
same survey instruments for both populations – citizenry and
political elites – we avoid mixing different modes of data collection.
Sample. Data on risk attitudes are available from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a household panel that has been
running since 1984 (Wagner et al., 2007; Headey et al., 2010). The
panel draws respondents from a nationally representative sample
of individuals aged 16 years and older, comprised of approxi-
mately 20,000 individuals interviewed annually over the period
under consideration. We used data from waves 2009 (N= 17,825)
and 2012 (N= 18,224), including only data of potential voters
(“constituents”), i.e., respondents aged 18 years or older with
German citizenship. We used data from wave 2009 because it is
the most recent wave available in which risk attitudes were
assessed for various domains. Compared to other waves, the
expressed risk propensity in 2009 was unusually low (most likely
due to the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008/2009, see Table
S4), which is why we conduct robustness checks using data from
the 2012 wave (with a higher average risk propensity), but for
which only the general risk attitude measure (see below) is
available. In 2012, the average population risk attitude was 4.8,
which is still signiﬁcantly lower than that of parliament members
(mean of 6.4). This holds true for all other waves that we look at;
Table S4 in the SI Appendix presents the average general risk
attitudes from 2008 to 2012.
To assess political representatives’ risk attitudes, we conducted
a postal survey of members of the German Federal Parliament
(Bundestag)4 and four German State Parliaments (Landtage) in
2012, using the same measures used in the SOEP (see SI Appendix
for details). At the time of the survey, the Bundestag consisted of
620 members and the four Landtage comprised a total of 512
representatives (149 from Berlin, 88 from Brandenburg, 137 from
Lower Saxony, and 138 from Baden-Wuerttemberg). In the
Bundestag 175 (28%), and in the Landtage 123 (24%),
questionnaires were returned (see Table S1 in SI Appendix for
details). Using this procedure, we cannot rule out that
questionnaires are actually answered by the political representa-
tives’ members of staff instead of themselves. We alleviated this
problem by explicitly stating the importance of personal answers
in the cover letter. To avoid any suspicion of the members of
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parliament that one would abuse the results on risk propensity by
party afﬁliation and hence reduce the willingness to participate in
the survey, no question on party afﬁliation was included in the
survey. In consequence, risk attitudes cannot be depicted by
political parties.
Measures. Risk attitudes are measured using two different and
well-established approaches (Coppola, 2014; Dohmen et al, 2011).
The ﬁrst approach measures respondents’ self-reported risk atti-
tudes in general and in the domains of car driving, ﬁnancial
matters, sports and leisure, career, health behavior, as well as faith
in other people. Politicians’ questionnaires included an additional
item on risk attitudes in political decision making (see SI
Appendix for details). The second approach measured risk atti-
tudes using a lottery-choice task, in which respondents decide on
a portion of a ﬁctive lottery-win to invest, having a 50/50 chance
of doubling the invested amount or losing half of it (see SI
Appendix). The hypothetical choice task has been validated with
actual experimental and paid lotteries and proven to accurately
measure individuals’ risk attitudes (Headey et al., 2010; Dohmen
et al., 2011). Frey et al., (2017) demonstrate that self-reports have
more prognostic power than behavioral experiments because the
experiments deal–by deﬁnition–with highly speciﬁc task domains.
In addition to risk attitudes, our surveys assessed respondents’
age, gender, and education (see SI Appendix for details).
Methods. To test whether political representative differ in their
risk attitudes from their voters, we used matching procedures.
Matching is the appropriated analytical tool here as we compare a
relative small group (political representative, N= 298) with a large
one (SOEP respondents, N > 20,000). It can thus be assumed that
one exact statistical twin can be found for each political repre-
sentative on the variables gender, education and age. We chose
Coarsened Exact Matching (Iacus et al., 2009; Iacus et al., 2011) as
it allowed us to approach the perfect matched sample as closely as
possible. Table S2 shows that the political representative and their
statistical twins are absolutely identical regarding gender and
education and the age differences are very small. With the political
representative and their statistical twins we then ran standard
linear regression (Table S3). Figure 3 is based on these regressions,
showing coarsened exact matching treatment effects (CEM TE)
and, thus, the difference between political representative and their
voters while controlling for potentially confounding effects
through differences in the gender, educational and age composi-
tions of the two groups. As a robustness check we conducted the
analysis while restricting the SOEP sample to only those who show
a strong interest in politics. Still, it needs to be acknowledged that
although coarsened exact matching allows a much stricter testing
for group differences than standard regression techniques, its
results are still only based on correlations and causality should not
be assumed in a straightforward fashion.
Results
Initial descriptive analyses of political representatives’ and con-
stituents’ attitudes toward risk (Fig. 1) suggest that German
politicians are more risk seeking than the general population in
all assessed risk domains. In most domains, members of the
Federal Parliament (Bundestag) report being more risk seeking
than members of the State Parliaments (Landtage), although the
differences are not signiﬁcant. In addition, no differences were
found between East and West German parliaments. A closer look
at the risk domains shows that differences between politicians and
the general population are most pronounced in the “career” and
“faith in other people” domains. In addition, political repre-
sentatives’ risk propensities in the “general risk taking” and
“political decisions” domains seem exceptionally high. The latter
relates to the problem that politicians might choose risky alter-
natives while citizens would have liked to avoid potential con-
sequence of such choices. This might be particularly relevant in
the domain of ﬁnancial matters. Since politicians report being
more risk seeking in these matters, it seems plausible that they are
also less risk averse than citizens in budgetary questions. This is
supported by a hypothetical choice-task (see Methods section) in
which, on average, politicians chose the riskier alternative with
the chance of a higher reward, but also with a higher risk of losing
the amount invested (Fig. 2).
To further account for the question of how politicians’ risk
attitude relate to their political decision making behavior, we
investigated whether their risk attitudes concerning political
matters can in fact be considered part of their general preference
for risk. To this end, we conducted a principal-component ana-
lysis and results show that politicians’ attitudes towards political
risk-taking resemble their preference for risk in other domains
(see Table S5 in SI Appendix). Hence, politicians who are gen-
erally risk loving will also seek risk in political decisions. This is
supported by existing research suggesting “that politicians favor
Political Decisions











Fig. 1 Average risk attitudes of political representatives (Bundestag and
Landtage, N= 298) and the general population (SOEP respondents) in
different domains. SOEP data for the “general risks” category are taken
from the 2012 (N= 20,806) wave; data for all other domains from 2009





















Fig. 2 Percentage of answers how to invest in the lottery-choice task for
political representatives (Bundestag and Landtage) and the general
population (SOEP respondents in 2009, N= 20,615)
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risk-seeking when faced with policy choices with varying levels of
uncertainty—consistently more so than the citizens who elect
them“ (Sheffer et al., 2017, p 16).
In a third step, we account for potential selection effects
resulting from various socio-demographic indicators. Using
Coarsened Exact Matching (Iacus et al., 2009; Iacus et al., 2011)
without coarsening to ensure a maximum balance and, hence,
comparability between treatment (politicians) and control (gen-
eral population) groups, we compare politicians’ risk attitudes
with the risk attitudes of those citizens who most closely resemble
them with respect to age, gender, and education. The latter two
indicators are particularly important since males and the higher
educated are known to be more risk seeking (Sapienza et al., 2009;
Tsebelis, 2002), with many politicians belonging to both of these
groups. Although, socio-demographic variables do explain much
of the variation in risk attitudes (Dohmen et al, 2011), it must be
acknowledged that not all potential confounding variables could
be controlled for.
For the matching procedure, we pool members of the Federal
and State Parliaments into one group and conduct two matching
analyses. The ﬁrst included all respondents in the population-based
survey, comparing political representatives to average citizens. The
second, more conservative, analysis includes only respondents from
the population-based survey who report being “very interested” in
politics and having a clear party preference (see SI Appendix for
details). This way, we can also investigate to what extent political
representatives differ from individuals with a pronounced interest in
politics (see Table S1 and S2 in SI Appendix for details).
The large number of control units allows for using the stricter
k-to-k matching solution (Iacus et al., 2009), resulting in the same
absolute number of treated and control individuals. Table S2
shows that the non-matched sample is, on average, less educated
than the political representatives are, and that the proportion of
men is higher among politicians. We ﬁnd similar distributions for
the politically interested citizen sample, with the exception that
they are younger than the sample of political representatives.
Including only politicians and their matched counterparts, we
used standard linear regressions to estimate the effect of being a
politician on risk propensity (see Table S3). Figure 3 illustrates
the coarsened exact matching treatment effects, showing that
even for the matched samples, the difference between politicians
and citizens remains signiﬁcant in all risk domains. Politicians are
not only signiﬁcantly more risk seeking than the average citizen,
but also than the politically interested citizens.
Discussion
Political representatives frequently need to make risky choices in
environments where the probabilities of gains and losses are hard
to estimate. The willingness to make risky decisions hinges on
individuals’ risk propensity, and anecdotal evidence describes
political representatives as either risk loving or risk averse. Based
on representative samples, this research therefore addressed the
question whether political representatives, due to their personal
traits, are signiﬁcantly more risk loving than their electorate. If so,
they do not represent their constituents’ willingness to take risks.
We hypothesized that occupational selection is a factor that leads
to a disproportionally high number of risk loving individuals
amongst political representatives. Comparing risk attitudes of two
representative samples of members of the German Federal and
State Parliaments with a representative sample of the German
population, our study shows that German politicians are, in fact,
signiﬁcantly more risk seeking than the average citizen in all
assessed risk domains. This even holds for matched samples and
the conservative comparison between politicians and politically
interested citizens.
Given that risk attitudes are shaped partly during socialization
and partly through genetically inherited factors, it seems that
professional politics attracts individuals with a disproportionally
high risk propensity. This is supported by the ﬁnding that poli-
tical representatives and citizens differ most notably with respect
to risk attitudes in the professional career domain. Occupational
selection not only seems to operate regarding selection into the
ﬁeld of professional politics, but also in view of career stages. In
Germany, as in many other countries, the way into professional
politics is a long and weary path, winding through many political
party institutions. Thus, the risk of personal failure and the
amount of decision-risks to which political representatives are
exposed, are high.
Our results have broad implications for the assessment of the
quality of democratic political systems. Political representatives
are more risk seeking than their constituents and, hence, might
often take risks their voters would not have taken. They might, for
example, decide to invest into nuclear energy, while the poten-
tially negative consequences of risky decisions, nuclear melt-
downs, affect societies on a global scale. Our results are
compatible with a common impression in Western democracies
that politicians and governments are often unable to accomplish
fundamental reforms (e.g., introducing new taxation schemes or
public health insurance). However, this “conservatism”, which is
often lamented by public choice theorists and political com-
mentators, does not seem to be an indication of risk aversion.
Rather, it is the result of the challenges of ﬁnding majorities in a
world with different interests and many veto players (Tsebelis,
2002). Hence, small changes and reforms are often the only viable
political option. They, too, have uncertain outcomes, and thus
may nevertheless satisfy politicians’ appetite for risk (Thomas
et al., 2017).
This raises the question of whether the principle of democratic
representation should account for character traits that are rele-
vant to the decision-making process. If this were the case, political
representatives might show larger overlap with their voters
regarding risk propensity and be less likely to make risky deci-
sions. However, democracies are characterized by sophisticated
systems of checks and balances, and far-reaching decisions are
rarely made by single individuals. Instead, multiple political
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Fig. 3 Coarsened exact matching treatment effects (CEM TE) results for
the effect of being a politician on risk attitudes (based on Table S3).
Reference groups are the total SOEP sample (black) and only those SOEP
respondents with an interest in politics (grey). The relationship is
statistically signiﬁcant when the 99% conﬁdence interval (gray and black
vertical lines) does not overlap the dotted line. SOEP data for the “general
risks” category are taken from the 2012 wave; data for all other domains
from 2009
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decision-making institutions negotiate and compromise, thus
limiting the role of individual risk propensities on high-impact
political issues.
One might thus argue that a certain proneness for making risky
decisions in uncertain environments might even be necessary for
good politics and societal evolution because–as Max Weber,
(1919, p 27) argued – “Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard
boards”. Similar to ﬁrms and businesses, democratic systems
might rely on individuals who are ready to take greater risks than
the median voter and that this “division of labor” between risk
seeking politicians and more risk averse voters might be a general
principle of societal evolution (Tsebelis, 2002). One could,
therefore, speculate that the combination of democratic institu-
tions with checks and balances, on the one hand, and relatively
risk seeking politicians acting within this political system, on the
other, is a basis for the success of democratic societies in which
bureaucrats who are less willing to take risks than politicians are
another means to control risk loving politicians (Thomas et al.,
2017).
Conclusion
Although decision-making under risk is crucial to politics, little is
known about the representation of traits that systematically
inﬂuence decision-making, in particular the risk propensity of
voters and politicians. Therefore, we investigated the degree to
which political representatives’ risk propensity resembles their
constituents’ risk propensity. Using representative samples of the
German Federal Parliament, four German State Parliaments, and
the general population of Germany, we show that political
representatives are signiﬁcantly more risk seeking than the
average citizen, even when using conservative matching proce-
dures and politically interested citizens as the comparison group.
A question not addressed by the present research is how our
ﬁndings translate to other democratic systems. One hypothesis
related to the idea that risk-seeking individuals self-select into
politics at disproportionately high levels would suggest cross-
national similarities in risk propensity differences between poli-
ticians and the general public. However, related lines of research
suggest pronounced cross-cultural differences in people’s risk
attitudes and behaviors, so that our research needs to be extended
to other cultural and national contexts.
Aside from these qualifying considerations, our ﬁndings point
towards a representation gap in the sense that political repre-
sentatives are more risk seeking than their constituents and,
hence, might often take risks their voters would not have taken.
From the perspective of descriptive representation, this points at a
possible weak spot of current democracies: politicians and citizens
do not match on psychological traits that are relevant for (poli-
tical) decision making. While this is arguably a signiﬁcant chal-
lenge to the principles of (descriptive) representation, we offer a
reassuring interpretation of this gap: we argue that a certain
proneness for making risky decisions in uncertain environments
is downright necessary for good policy and societal evolution,
especially considering the inertia caused by the path dependency
tendencies of political institutions. Individual politicians might be
risk loving and be prepared for risky decisions when they are
unavoidable (e. g. in case of war), but they are controlled by a
“balance of power”. So we can conclude with the words of former
German Federal President, Walter Scheel: “Nothing happens
without risk, but without taking risks, nothing happens.”5
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Notes
1 Caesar cited Menander, a Greek writer (The Principal Fragments, 391, “Be cast the
die!”). According to Plutarch (Life of Pompey, 60.2.9 http://penelope.uchicago.edu/
Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Caesar*.html) Caesar gave the quote in the
Greek language (“anerriphtho kybos“) and mentioned the riskiness: “But ﬁnally, with a
sort of passion, as if abandoning calculation and casting himself upon the future, and
uttering the phrase with which men usually prelude their plunge into desperate and
daring fortunes, Let the die be cast.“ (Plutarch, The Life of Julius Caesar, 32.8.4 http://
penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Pompey*.html). The
more popular translation “the die is cast” (alea iacta est, Suetonius, Divus Julius 32,1) is
misleading (e.g., Pöppelmann 2009, pp 13–14). Nothing was settled, the future was
open and uncertain. Lewis and Short (1879, entry: ālĕa) give the right translation of the
Greek sentence: “Jacta alea esto”. Which they translate in English as “Let the dice be
cast! Let the game be ventured!”
2 The Richard Nixon Foundation. Download from http://blog.nixonfoundation.org/
2011/04/the-quotable-richard-nixon/
3 www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/m/markzucker453450.html
4 For a very ﬁrst descriptive analysis of the data, see Hess et al. (2013).
5 http://www.nur-zitate.com/autor/Walter_Scheel
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